FPS Editorial: Mogadishu’s Shift in Focus: From Al Shabaab to Electoral Politics – December, 2024.
In recent years, Somalia has been at the forefront of a military struggle against the Islamist militant group Al Shabaab, an affiliate of Al Qaeda. However, under the current leadership of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre, there appears to be a significant shift in priorities away from counterterrorism efforts against Al Shabaab. Instead, the political, financial, and security apparatus of Mogadishu has turned its gaze towards Jubaland and the local politics surrounding its regional president, Ahmed Madobe, and the sham election he conducted in November 2024.
The Federal Government’s focus in Jubaland is primarily centered on strategic calculations regarding the upcoming national elections in 2026. This focus is heavily influenced by the perceived negative implications that the political survival of Ahmed Madobe, the Jubaland regional leader, may have on President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s chances for reelection. As such, Villa Somalia views the dynamics in Jubaland not only through governance and democratic lenses but also primarily through the broader electoral landscape it can present at the national level.
The concentration on Kismayo and the political maneuvers aimed at unseating Ahmed Madobe have taken center stage in the strategic initiatives of Villa Somalia. This shift in the allocation of resources and focus has raised significant concerns regarding the stability of Somalia, as well as the potential repercussions for the broader East African region. The implications of these developments underscore the interconnected nature of regional politics, where local actions can reverberate beyond national borders, threatening both peace and security throughout the East African region.
The federal government’s obsession with regional politics in Jubaland has been marked by various tactics aimed at diminishing Madobe’s influence. These include deploying military forces in what some perceive as an attempt at regime change, and leveraging national media and propaganda to sway public opinion against the current self-elected Jubaland administration. However, even if Madobe were to step down tomorrow, Villa Somalia is ill-prepared to manage the transition in that region without risking further instability or even civil conflict in Jubaland.
The underlying issue is not necessarily about Madobe’s personal appeal but rather the fear of federal overreach and power abuse. The majority of the local populace, including those in the Gedo region, the largest region in Jubaland state with 7 districts out of Jubaland state’s entire 14 districts, has long opposed the administration in Kismayo. However, they have now effectively remained on the fence, if not outright sided with Madobe, largely out of the realization that any federal intervention could lead to a Mogadishu hand-picked administration instead of a fairly elected Jubaland leader.
The danger the prevailing confusion poses is manifold. Al Shabaab, with its resilient operational capacity, could capitalize on the vacuum created by Somalia’s distracted leadership. The group has historically used political and social instability to expand its influence, not only within Somalia but also across borders into Kenya, Ethiopia, and other neighboring countries. An intensified Al Shabaab presence would mean more frequent attacks, increased displacement, and a heightened risk of regional insurgency.
Moreover, the lack of focus on Al Shabaab could lead to a resurgence of the group’s activities, undoing years of international and national efforts to curb its influence. The international bilateral partners, the United Nations as well as the African Union have invested heavily in peacekeeping missions like AMISOM/ATMIS/AUSSOM but without a strong and unified Somali government effort, these gains could be lost, leaving the region vulnerable to terrorism and further humanitarian crises.
To address these issues, it is Foresight for Practical Solutions’ view that it is crucial for genuine dialogue to be initiated within the Federal Government institutions. The leadership must recalibrate its national priorities back to the existential threat posed by Al Shabaab. This would involve:
Reallocating Resources: Moving financial and military resources from political power plays to strengthening national defense and counter-terrorism units.
Institutional Refocus: Ensuring that all branches of government, from security to diplomacy, are re-aligned in their strategy against Al Shabaab, rather than being distracted by local electoral and political squabbles.
Clear Strategy for the Future: Villa Somalia needs to develop a clear, inclusive plan for how to manage the upcoming national elections in a way that promotes peace, development, and autonomy within the federal framework.
In conclusion, the current political dynamics in Somalia, where national leadership is more engaged in electoral politics than in combating Al Shabaab, pose a significant threat to not only Somalia’s stability but also to the broader peace of East Africa. A refocus on the primary security threats through sincere internal dialogue and strategic realignment is not just advisable but necessary to prevent a further escalation of conflict and terrorism in the region.
FPS: Fostering Thoughts; Forging Futures.